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 The Diconsa program was created in 1976 as a means to distribute basic commodities 
(corn, beans, rice, sugar, corn flour, powdered milk and tortilla products) at subsidized prices to 
marginalized populations throughout Mexico in rural stores. Diconsa products retail at prices on 
average 7%
1
 lower than their open-market equivalents, a result of the Diconsa principle that 
transportation and operational costs are not passed on to the consumer.  
 
 The Diconsa program is essentially a government intervention in the private market for 
basic food commodities, providing a regulatory price anchor and increasing the targeted 
population‟s food security by means of increasing its purchasing power and by subsidizing staple 
foods. This targeted population consists of rural households in highly marginalized areas, where 
prohibitive operating costs prevent the establishment of a sufficiently competitive private market.  
 
 The aim of this thesis is to assess more precisely the program‟s contribution to what must 
be considered a fundamental motivation for its implementation – improving the nutrition levels in 
low-income households. This is potentially an informative analysis because substitution for less-
nutritious foods has previously been empirically observed in the general case of decreasing 
relative prices, and in particular Jensen & Miller‟s study (2008) shows that there is no evidence 
for an increase in nutrition in the case of specific food subsidies for the very poor, and some for 
an actual decrease. Given the costs of maintaining food subsidies, I believe this is an important 
area of policy research. 
 
I believe my study will provide a useful test of these results in a different setting, a 
different program, a different type of subsidy, and within a much larger and demographically 
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more varied sample. This sample data is contained in the 2010 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y 
Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH), or „National Survey of Household Incomes and Expenditures‟, 
by the National Mexican Institute for Geography and Statistics‟ (INEGI). This survey is taken 





1. The particular pattern of multiple commodity food subsidies provided through Diconsa 
does not significantly improve household nutrition levels amongst the targeted population 
of the rural poor in Mexico. 
2. The consumer response to the subsidy is to alter diet composition without increasing the 
overall nutritional content of the household food basket 
3. The subsidization of staple commodities results in significant income effects which 
increase overall household food consumption  
4. Consumer response to the subsidy is at least partly dependent on specific household 




The main body of this thesis will draw on econometric analysis of the Mexican household 
survey data. I will first have to establish a control group of households – non-participants – using 
the propensity score matching method. Participation is (initially) defined as the purchase of at 
least one food product in Diconsa during the week long survey. Specifically, what I will then be 
looking for is: 
𝐸 𝑁1
∗ −  𝑁0
∗ 𝑋,𝑑 = 1) = 𝐴𝑇𝐸1 
 
where 𝑁0
∗  and 𝑁1
∗  are the level of nutrition with and without treatment respectively, 𝑑 is the 
dummy variable for Diconsa participation. X is a set of control variables, such as household 
income, etc, which is determined by the propensity score matching method.  
The propensity score is essentially a probability, for a given household, of participation in 
the Diconsa program given the set of X variables. I match treatment households (participants) 
with control households (non-participants) according to propensity scores – matching like with 
like. I am then able to compare the two groups in order to see whether Diconsa participation has a 
statistically significant effect on nutrition levels once the X variables are controlled for, and to 
determine the sign of this effect – whether it is positive or negative.  
I will then attempt to confirm my results by carrying out a number of robustness checks. 
This will involve modifying the set of X variables, as well as restricting the control group to 
households located in municipalities without a Diconsa store and comparison with OLS 
regressions with varying specifications at the household and municipal level. If the robustness 
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checks fail, I will attempt to explain which significant unobservable characteristics might be 
absent from the data.  
Given the methodological approach, I will also be able to identify which of the X 
variables – income, etc – are most important in determining participation, and, by looking at 
different propensity scores, I will be able to ascertain how the nutritional effect of participation 
(be it positive or negative) varies with different X characteristics. Furthermore, the detailed food 
expenditure data contained in the survey will allow me to uncover the specifics of the consumer 
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This thesis is an empirical research project assessing the household nutritional impact of the 
DICONSA food subsidy program in Mexico. By employing a combination of propensity score 
matching and OLS econometric approaches, I conduct an analysis of household survey data 
contained in La Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) from Mexico. I 
find strong evidence of a significant increase in household caloric intake in rural areas targeted by 
the program, driven primarily by increased consumption of DICONSA subsidised cereal products 
and corn grain in particular. I find no evidence of decreased caloric intake resulting from 
overriding income effects of subsidisation. However, my investigation into the specifics of 
participant household food expenditure data suggests that reselling of subsidised commodities 
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1.1  Motivation 
 
From January 2000 to January 2012, food prices across the world increased by over 220%
2
, 
doubling in the space of three years between 2005 and 2008. The underlying economic reasons 
behind this unprecedented spike are layered and diverse, although a commonly identified culprit 
is greatly increased demand for industrial biofuel (Lustig, 2009). In the immediate future at least, 
the implications for the poorest people in developing countries are potentially serious, and the 
food security of many of these vulnerable populations looks increasingly in jeopardy (Lustig, 
2009). It is at such times that the effective functioning of social safety nets is crucial, with the 
prevention of widespread hunger being a fundamental policy objective, particularly in developing 
countries. Depending on a particular country‟s geographic, social and economic situation, these 
nutritional safety nets may take many forms, from relatively simple conditional cash transfers to 
precisely targeted nutrition programs for children. The majority, however, work on the 
assumption that consumer behaviour can be positively influenced, in terms of nutritional intake, 
by some combination of 1) increasing overall purchasing power in target populations, 2) 
increasing supply in target areas and 3) providing incentives for consumption of particular types 
of foods – specifically those with greater nutritional benefits. Food subsidy programs, an 
important component of food policy in numerous developed and developing countries alike, are 
an example of a policy strategy that attempts to ensure food (nutritional) security amongst target 
populations by combining, in varying degrees, all three approaches listed above. Countries like 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Venezuela, 
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 Data taken from FAO, 2012 
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Colombia and Mexico have all built up extensive distribution networks and administrative 
infrastructure dedicated solely to the provision of subsidised foods. The costs of these programs 
can be quite substantial, with Egypt, Iran and Morocco, for example, respectively allocating 
1.7%, 2.7% and 1.7% of their entire Gross Domestic Products to maintaining these subsidises.
3
 
Given their prevalence, and the costs incurred, the question of whether these programs actually 
achieve their stated goals is an important area of policy research. Though these goals may be 
many and diverse, the improvement of the nutritional status of those at risk of malnutrition is an 
almost universal one, and it is in this area of study that this thesis, it is hoped, can make a 
contribution. 
While the casual observer might see the question of whether the subsidisation of staple, 
nutritious foods directed at poor populations can indeed improve nutrition amongst these 
households as one that is universally answered in the affirmative and thus trivial, recent carefully-
conducted studies have cast doubt on this most basic of assumptions (Jensen & Miller, 2008a, 
Kochar, 2005, Cunha, 2010). Even though the subsidy, appropriately targeted, amounts to an 
income transfer due to the associated increase in relative purchasing power, these studies found 
that the effect on caloric intake – one of many possible proxy indicators of nutrition levels - is 
ambiguous at best. One study (Jensen & Miller, 2008a), conducted in China, found the provision 
of staples at subsidised prices to extremely poor households had a negative effect on caloric 
intake, due to certain interactions of consumer behaviour at the microeconomic level. These 
findings have potentially major policy implications, as a mere increase in purchasing power is not 
enough to justify food-based safety net interventions, once we consider that cash transfers can 
achieve essentially the same goal. This thesis thus attempts to investigate the change, or lack 
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 Data taken from World Bank 2011, 1999 figures. 
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thereof, in caloric intake observed in the target households of what is an interesting example of a 
food subsidy program, the Diconsa program in Mexico. This program was chosen for this 
research for three reasons: a) while other food programs in Mexico have been the subject of 
empirical studies, the Diconsa program, to the best of my knowledge, has not, b) the Diconsa is 
an interesting case, combining geographic targeting with multiple but non-uniform subsidies 
without restrictions on the quantity purchased, and c) the high quality household survey data that 
is available from Mexican sources. This last point is important, as this study is carried out using 
various econometric techniques which are dependent on a rich source of data. Using these 
techniques in this alternative setting, it is hoped that further empirical evidence can be found, 
either supporting or contradicting the results of the studies mentioned above. Such evidence 
could potentially be informative in devising related policy interventions in the future, to the 
benefit of those most in need - this concisely summarises the wider motivation for this thesis.   
1.2  The Diconsa program in rural Mexico 
The Diconsa food program was originally created by the Mexican government in 1972 to 
distribute basic food commodities such as corn, beans, rice, sugar, corn flour, powdered milk and 
tortilla products at subsidised prices to marginalised rural populations throughout Mexico.
4
 Retail 
outlets were established in target locations, supported by a wholesale procurement and transport 
network. By 1976, there were 1,500 Diconsa stores in operation, and by 2006 this number had 
increased to 22,312.
5
 Today, there are 23,711 stores
6
 in approximately 21,200 communities, of 
which 4,000 depend on Diconsa outlets as their only food commodity retailer.
7
 The supporting 
infrastructure comprises some 7,700 workers, 28 central warehouses, 270 rural warehouses, 35 
                                                             
4 Data taken from Gundersen et al, 2000 
5
 Data taken from Diconsa PAR reporte final, 2006 
6 DIconsa (Dicrectorio de Tiendas), 2010 
7
 Data taken from Chora, 2011  
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administrative offices and a fleet of 3,500 vehicles.
8
 In addition to providing subsidised 
commodities to marginalised rural localities, the Diconsa network is integrated with government 
subsidised in-kind transfer programmes such as Liconsa (providing powdered milk directly to 
poor households) and the conditional cash transfer programme Opportunidades. This thesis, 
however, will be concerned only with El Program del Abasto Rural (The Rural Supply Program) 
or PAR, which refers specifically to the provision of subsidised commodities for retail rather than 
direct transfer. PAR has been in operation under its current name since 1979.  
The underlying motivation for the Diconsa programme is stated in Mexico‟s National 
Development Plan 2007-2012 (Strategy 3.1): ensuring that “all Mexicans in poverty can cover 
their food, housing, basic services, education, and health necessities.” Slightly more specifically, 
 Diconsa seeks to 1) improve the nutrition of Mexicans living in rural communities in order to 
promote family development and 2) supply complementary, basic yet high-quality products at a 
low price to those localities most in need, in an efficient and timely fashion.
9
 These - clearly 
related - goals are formulated in response to the failure of the private market to provide cheap 
food to poor households in isolated rural communities (Fox, 2007). A lack of infrastructure and 
the resulting high transportation costs, combined with a relatively low population density which 
reduces the incentive for new enterprise and thus competition, means that these households are 
subject to higher food prices than other areas where the basic food commodities market is more 
competitive and less costly for retailers. Hence the intention is to intervene in the private sector 
and provide a regulatory price anchor in the market for these commodities, increasing the 
targeted population‟s food security by means of increasing its purchasing power.  Internal and 
                                                             
8 Chora, 2011 (See Appendix II) 
9
 Diconsa, 2011  
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external evaluations have since confirmed the „pro-consumer impact‟ of the program, at least 
with regard to the purchasing power objective (Fox, 2007). 
As outlined by Victoria Chora (2011), director of development with Diconsa, selection of 
localities for Diconsa intervention is dependent on two primary criteria: 1) the community‟s 
population must be less than 2,500 inhabitants, and 2) the locality must have a „very high‟ or 
„high‟ index of marginalisation as determined by the National Population Council (CONAPO). 
According to the PAR external evaluation of 2006, there are 23,707 localities that qualify under 
these criteria and an additional 7,566 which are said to qualify under special circumstances. Of 
the total 31,314 localities (37 million people), 16,827 localities (17 million people) already 
possess at least one Diconsa store – a programme coverage of 53.7% if we restrict ourselves to 
the target populations as defined. The establishment of a Diconsa outlet in a given locality is not 
strictly one for government authorities, however, but rather one that is taken on the basis of 
public demand for a store. Thus, a locality could theoretically fulfil the eligibility criteria and yet 
not require a Diconsa store, most likely because a competitive, low-priced private market for 
food commodities is already present. Data from the same study reveal that – in 2006 – roughly 
85% of Diconsa stores are located in target locations as defined under the strict criteria or in 
locations qualifying under „special circumstances‟. Also worth noting is that 23% of localities of 
high marginalisation have at least one Diconsa store, while the same can be said of 9% of 
localities of very high marginalisation (2006 data). The reason for this imbalance is not clear in 
the absence of more detailed data at locality level. It is possible that a higher percentage of the 
former group are rural localities, although household survey data suggests the opposite, with 93% 
of households in the very highly marginalised group found in rural localities (less than 2,500 
inhabitants) versus 79% for the highly marginalised. What seems most likely is that the isolation 
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of the very poorest communities makes it difficult for even government-maintained distribution 
networks to reach them.  
Today, the list of products sold in Diconsa stores numbers some 200 commodities, including 
cereals, sugar, oil, vegetables, meat, fish, dairy and various drinks as well as certain non-food 
items such as kerosene, soap and toilet paper. There is an emphasis on high nutritional content 
throughout the food product base. Although all products are not sold at all stores, the minimum 
requirement for all Diconsa outlets is that they provide what is known as „Diconsa‟s basic 
basket‟: a selection of 21 basic, non-perishable items including corn, wheat and corn flour, rice, 
beans, sugar, cooking oil and soap (full list in appendix, Appendix I). According to Diconsa‟s 
operational rules, this basic basket as provided in their stores must represent a saving of between 
3 and 7% versus the equivalent basket as purchased from private retailers. The 2006 independent 
evaluation of PAR found the overall Diconsa versus private saving on the basic basket to be 
approximately 6% (PAR Evaluación Externa, 2006) although this is not evenly spread across the 
different commodities. A more detailed account of the difference in prices as obtained from 
survey expenditure data will be given in section 4. It is important to note here that Diconsa prices 
are not fixed below market prices directly; Diconsa absorbs the transportation and operational 
costs involved in maintaining the distribution network and this saving is then passed onto the 
consumer. Also, Diconsa stores are not government-owned premises but are owned by the 
community or by private individuals who must abide by basic pricing and operational rules but 
are otherwise unconstrained. As a result, prices of Diconsa products may vary between different 
locations to a certain degree. Apart from a significant dip following the 2008 financial crisis, 
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Diconsa‟s total sales have been rising steadily since 2004 – having declined markedly from 2000 
- and in 2009 totalled some $737.5 million.
10
 
1.3  Hypothesis and empirical questions 
This thesis is an attempt to test a basic general hypothesis as well as a number of related, 
more specific hypotheses. The general hypothesis is as follows: the establishment of subsidised 
Diconsa food outlets in targeted locations imparts significant nutritional benefits, in terms of 
caloric intake, to participant households. This hypothesis is based on basic consumer demand 
theory, which assumes that consumption (quantity demanded) of a particular good will increase 
as its price decreases. Given Diconsa‟s commitment to reducing prices of staple food 
commodities through subsidisation, one might reasonably expect that increased consumption of 
these staples amongst those at whom the program is targeted would logically follow. In the 
review of previous studies that follows, however, the apparent rationality of this conclusion will 
be questioned. Subsidisation of appropriate food commodities is not as simple and 
straightforward a solution to the problem of undernutrition as it might initially appear. 
Although the majority of the analysis that follows will be an attempt to test this primary 
hypothesis, there are a number of other interesting empirical questions that may also be  
answered in doing so. These questions, in the order that they are addressed, are as follows: 
1) What is the caloric composition of a given household‟s typical food basket, and how 
does it change as income increases? 
2) What is the basic relationship observed between food expenditure, income and caloric 
intake? 
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 Data taken from Chora, 2011 
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3) Is there are a significant caloric deficit amongst the poorest households in the ENIGH 
survey, thus justifying the Diconsa intervention on nutritional grounds? 
4) What is the observed effect of the Diconsa intervention on specific goods in 
participant household‟s food basket in expenditure and caloric terms? 
5) Is the food basket of Diconsa households as recorded by expenditure data likely to be 
a true reflection of actual household consumption? 
Empirical results relating to the primary hypothesis and the above questions, the subject of 
section 4, are generally presented as straightforward quantative estimates  obtained through the 
various methodological approaches (section 4) and are supplemented by more in-depth analysis 
with graphical depictions being used to illustrate where necessary.  
1.4  Structure of this paper 
This thesis deals specifically with the nutritional aspect of the Diconsa programme. The 
stated aim is to investigate in detail the nutritional impact of the programme at the household 
level, to try and first answer the question of whether this particular type of subsidy programme 
imparts significant nutritional benefits to participating households and if it does, to what extent 
and through which channels of consumer behaviour. To this end, I will be applying various 
econometric methods to data provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía  
(INEGI, National Institute of Statistics and Geography) in Mexico. Specifically, I will be 
analysing the 2010 survey data on household income and expenditure contained in Encuesta 
Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos (ENIGH, National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure) 
2010 as well as, to a lesser extent, that contained in the same survey of 2008. In what follows I 
will briefly outline the structure of this paper, so that the reader may more clearly follow the 
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various empirical questions I will be addressing and the methodological steps that I will be taking 
in doing so.  
I will begin, in the next section, by providing theoretical and empirical background giving a 
brief review of previous studies into general and specific aspects of food subsidy programmes 
and the implications for consumer behaviour. Here I will be reviewing a selection of more 
general studies before going on to look in more detail at more recent, technical studies which are 
particularly relevant to the present study both in terms of methodology and the particular 
questions that are being addressed. 
 Section 3 is dedicated to the methodology that I will be employing in attempting to 
answer the empirical questions that I put forward. As the majority of the data analysis is 
performed on the statistics and econometrics package Stata, it is necessary to clearly detail the 
models and assumptions behind my results, and to justify them where necessary. These results 
are then presented in Section 4, where I shall also give my own interpretation of their 
implications within the context of the hypotheses I am testing. Robustness checks of results 
presented are also detailed in this section, followed by a conclusion (section 5) in which the final 
contribution of the thesis is evaluated from a more general perspective. 
 
2) Review of Previous Studies 
2.1 General studies 




1) (To ensure that) all or certain groups of households have access to certain specified minimum 
quantity of staple foods at “reasonable” prices and… 
2) …to transfer incomes to certain population groups through lower food prices or food stamps.  
If we confine our attention to the Diconsa program, it is easy to see a commitment to these goals 
reflected in the program framework. As will be empirically confirmed in section 4 of this paper, 
Diconsa subsidies, passed on to the consumer through the mechanisms described in section 1.1, 
are directed primarily at cheap and nutritious staple foods, specifically cereals and, in particular, 
corn products. Subsiding staple commodities in this fashion serves as an additional form of 
targeting over and above that which is achieved through the strategic location of Diconsa stores. 
Firstly, as Pinstrup-Andersen (1988b) points out, poor consumers spend a higher proportion of 
their income on food and thus will theoretically benefit more, proportionally, than richer 
consumers from subsidization of any food that is consumed in at least equal quantities by 
different income quantiles. This relationship can summarized in graphical and mathematical 
terms by what is known as an Engel curve, with a graphical representation in the Mexican case 
presented in section 4. The effect is magnified, however, with the good specific subsidization of a 
staple commodity like corn. As many studies have recognized (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988b Kumar 
& Alderman, 1988, Rogers, 1988a, Long & Brownell, 2010, French, 2003, Senauer, 1990, 
Zarazig & Adams, 1996), it is usually preferable to select staple goods for subsidization because 
of the extra sensitivity of the targeted group – the poor - to price changes in this commodity 
compared to richer consumers. More precisely, as Rogers (1988a) puts it, the good or goods 
selected should have high (negative) price elasticity of demand amongst the targeted group and 
zero price elasticity amongst other - usually higher - income groups. This means that the targeted 
group is likely to increase its consumption of the staple good as the price decreases, while the 
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higher income groups will not adjust consumption, thus restricting the benefit of the subsidy to 
the former population. Ideally, this good is consumed in large quantities to begin with by the 
targeted group, and consumed less or not at all by the non-targeted (Rogers, 1988a). Such a good, 
in classical demand theory, is said to have negative income elasticity (its consumption decreases 
with income) and is termed an „inferior good‟. With the preceding reasoning in mind, it is clear 
that commodity-specific price-targeting is a cost-effective means for policymakers to skew the 
subsidy benefit in favour of those they are trying to help. 
Note that the above description of consumer response to a price change assumes that the 
quantity of the subsidized good available for purchase is unlimited and is restricted to the effect 
on consumption of the subsidized good alone. This is not the full picture, however. It is important 
to distinguish here between the substitution effect of a subsidy and the income effect (Rogers, 
1988a, George, 1988, Valdis, 1988, Kumar & Alderman, 1988), as the total benefit of a particular 
subsidy should be measured after both are taken into account. The substitution effect refers to the 
increase in consumption resulting from a decrease in price, as described above, while the income 
effect is the relative increase in income that results from having to spend less on a particular good 
to purchase the desired amount, thus leaving extra income free to spend on other goods, be they 
food or otherwise. If a subsidy on an individual commodity is inframarginal, that is, if its real 
value in quantity terms for a given household is less than the total amount that the household 
would consume in the absence of the subsidy, then the increase in total food intake is expected in 
theory to be confined to the income effect only (Rogers, 1988a, Kumar & Alderman, 1988). This 
is because the price at the margin, or the price of an extra unit of food above the usual amount, 
remains the same. In this sense, a rationing or food stamp scheme, where the quantity of a 
subsidized food that a single household may obtain may be inframarginal, is theoretically 
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equivalent to an equally-valued cash transfer and any increase in caloric intake should be equal 
whichever form the subsidy takes, although there it is not entirely clear if this holds universally 
true in practice (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988a). However, when, as in the Diconsa program, the 
quantity is (theoretically) not restricted, the household is likely to increase its consumption of the 
subsidized good above that which it would consume in the absence of the subsidy (Alderman, 
1988, Rogers, 1988b). This is the substitution effect described in the previous paragraph. The two 
effects are not mutually independent, however, and subsidising a staple good without limits on 
quantities will usually have income effects as well as substitution effects – the consumption of 
other goods may increase (or decrease) at the same time due to the income effect. In summary, 
the price effect of a subsidy may be decomposed into two parts: the income effect and the 
substitution effect. It is necessary to take both these effects into account when considering the 
potential benefits of a subsidy. 
 Unfortunately, when it comes to demand for calories, or demand for a nutritious diet 
however it is defined, the components of a particular consumer‟s demand for food are not quite 
so simple. Senauer (1990) finds that income elasticity for energy (calories) exceeds that for food 
expenditure as a whole for both the urban and rural poor. As he puts it, these groups simply do 
not conform to what would be „optimal‟ behaviour when it comes to maximizing caloric intake as 
extra income becomes available. The problem (though it perhaps should not strictly be called a 
„problem‟) is that consumer demand for food is not a simple relationship between nutritional 
need, income levels and price. French (2003) recognizes that even if people know what 
constitutes the ideal nutritious diet, other considerations such as taste and variety can be just as 
important, or even more so. Similarly, Zazazig & Adams (1996), in their analysis of the Egyptian 
food subsidy system, suggest making a distinction between the utility of variety across the diet as 
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a whole, the utility of taste of each specific food and the utility of energy (calories). Even at 
subsistence levels of income, there is no reason to assume that the latter utility is the only 
consideration. When combined with the income/substitution effect tradeoff outlined above, this 
has important implications for food subsidy programs which explicitly aim to improve nutrition 
through price manipulation, such as the Diconsa program. Because of the complex interaction of 
demand components, the targeted consumer response to the subsidy is not necessarily an 
automatic increase in consumption of the subsidized staple exactly proportional to the decrease in 
price as would be required for this type of price targeting to be ideally precise. In fact, the relative 
magnitude of income effects of a subsidy can often be quite significant, and the increased 
purchasing power of the targeted consumer can lead to their altering their diet composition by 
substituting away from nutritious foods towards those more desirable in terms of taste, or simply 
to add variety (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988a, Kumar & Alderman, 1988, Xuguang et al, 1999, 
Senauer, 1990).  The issue becomes even more complex when subsidies are applied to multiple 
goods as in the Diconsa case. The changes in diet composition can even be so extreme, amongst 
certain types of households, that the subsidy causes a decrease in caloric intake as the income 
effect overrides the substitution effect and causes a decrease in the consumption of the staple 
good that is subsidized – the previously elusive „Giffen‟ behaviour (Jensen & Miller, 2008b). 
 The issues of calorie-adverse price effects of the subsidies detailed above are of direct 
relevance to the analysis contained in this thesis. However, there are other aspects of food 
subsidy programs which, although outside the scope of this thesis, are nevertheless interesting to 
consider and very relevant in a wider context. Three of these that will now be briefly covered 
here, all related to some degree, are geographical targeting, costs versus benefits and political 
considerations.   
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 Conducting an accurate cost-benefit analysis of a food subsidy program is an extremely 
difficult task. Valdis (1988) makes the point that identifying the full range of economic 
implications of a given program for a country as whole is quite arbitrary. The most obvious cost 
is that of subsidizing the food staples themselves. But there are also the costs of maintaining the 
distribution network, administrative departments, staff, product packaging (in Diconsa‟s case) 
and numerous other expenditure considerations that must be taken into account. For programs 
like Diconsa, with nationwide coverage, these costs can be substantial. And while these particular 
costs may theoretically be accurately calculated, there are still others which may be quite 
significant and near impossible to quantify. Neoclassical economists, for example, argue that 
subsidies of specific goods have an adverse net welfare effect through their distortion of market 
prices, working on the assumption that a freely-operating market is necessarily pareto-optimal, 
i.e. that no one individual can be made better-off without making another worse-off (Kumar & 
Alderman, 1988, Jensen & Miller, 2008a).  Related to this criticism is the fact that the market for 
food, particularly in poor rural areas, is a two-way system in that rural households are often 
producers – farmers - as well as consumers of food, and as a consequence the net effect on their 
welfare, nutritional or otherwise, of a decrease in prices of a staple crop like corn is not at all 
obvious (Senauer, 1990) and ultimately near-impossible to calculate accurately without hugely 
detailed datasets. On top of these, there are still further costs associated with imprecise targeting, 
or „leakages‟. Leakages occur when households that are not intentionally targeted by the 
programs receive some of the benefit, specifically by purchasing the subsidized food at cheaper 
prices. Although the benevolent policy-maker wants to provide food security to as many people 
as possible, there is also a need to ensure that the benefit is imparted only to those who need it the 
most, as otherwise costs can spiral out of control. There is therefore a trade-off to be made 
between narrow targeting and minimizing leakages at the cost of perhaps not reaching some of 
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those most in need, and more unrestricted targeting to maximize coverage while risking leakages 
(Rogers, 1988a).  While food stamps are an example of narrowly-targeted programs, in that 
household eligibility is assessed on an individual basis, the targeting criteria followed by Diconsa 
is an example of geographical targeting, where the identification of highly-marginalised, remote 
rural locations for the establishment of Diconsa stores is intended to restrict coverage only to 
those most in need, without requiring households to go through a time-consuming and possibly 
imperfect screening process.  
 Precise identification of the benefits of food subsidy programs is also problematic. 
Determining the effect on household consumption, or the effect on nutrition, as this thesis 
attempts to do is not straightforward in itself, but the measurement of certain other benefits 
presents a much bigger problem. Even assuming that significant nutritional benefits are indeed 
imparted by the program in question, it is quite another matter to assess the diverse economic 
effects realized through the channels of healthcare costs, labour productivity or social and human 
capital. Aside from this, there is also the political dimension to consider. Hopkins (1988) refers to 
the political motivations behind targeted programs, where food subsidies are means of garnering 
political support amongst certain populations. Whether this counts as a benefit or cost, or more 
exactly, which to whom, is open to debate. Hopkins also draws our attention to the other side of 
the political coin, where long-standing and far-reaching food subsidy programs can foster the 
„myth‟ of a fundamental right to cheap food for every person, and any attempt to withdraw these 
subsidies is met with fierce popular opposition.  
As we can see, the matter of the real net social value of any food subsidy program is one 
infused with numerous political and economic considerations and interactions, all-in-all too 
complex to be resolved in the near future with any degree of certainty. Small questions, however, 
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like that with which this thesis concerns itself, may be reasonably expected to have identifiable 
answers, given the right data and the right methodology. Thus we now turn our attention to other, 
slightly more technical studies, which attempt to answer similarly „small-scale‟ questions using 
concrete empirical data.  
2.2  Recent Empirical Studies 
Kochar, Tritah, Mckenzie, Wood et al & Cunha: Mexico & India 
 What follows is a brief review of the methods and results from five studies carried out by 
Kochar (2005), Tritah (2004), Wood et al (2010) Cunha (2010) and Mckenzie (2004). The 
research of Kochar and Tritah looks at the effects on caloric intake or food consumption (Tritah) 
of the Public Distribution System in India. In Mexico, Cunha compares the effectiveness of in-
kind transfers versus cash transfers, while McKenzie attempts to answer the question of whether 
tortillas are a Giffen good ( i.e. whether their price elasticity of demand is in fact positive), and 
Wood et al look at welfare effects for Mexican households of recent food price increases . 
 India‟s Public Distribution System (PDS) distributes various staple food items (wheat, 
rice, oil), as well as basic non-food necessities such as kerosene, to the urban and rural poor at 
subsidized prices. Once a universal coverage program, since June 1997 it has been restructured in 
an attempt to target more efficiently households falling below the poverty line, and renamed the 
Targeted Public Distribution System. Households above this line are still able to access the 
program, but benefits in terms of price and quantity allocations are significantly skewed in favour 
of the poorer group (Kochar, 2005). Kochar exploits the policy shift and the corresponding shift 
in relative prices for the different groups to try and identify the precise real value of the income 
transfer of the subsidy for participants, and then includes the fitted values for the this regression 
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in a second stage regression with caloric intake as the dependent variable in a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), instrumental variable (IV) approach. He then interprets the coefficient of the 
subsidy value in the second stage regression as the elasticity of caloric intake with respect to the 
real magnitude of the subsidy. Using repeated cross-sectional data of approximately 76,000 
households, he finds that the elasticity of caloric-intake is quite low, at 0.06 – 0.08. This implies 
that a 1% increase in the subsidy as calculated would result in only a 0.06% increase in caloric 
intake. Combined with the problem of low program uptake amongst the targeted households, the 
resulting increase amongst poor households (below the poverty line) amounted to a mere 31 
calories per person per day.  
 Titah‟s paper also addresses the effect of the TPDS subsidy on household welfare, 
although he approaches the problem from a somewhat different angle. Rather than looking at 
caloric intake, he focuses instead on the increase in food expenditure share and the implied 
increase in food consumption that results from participating in a the TPDS program. This 
participation (or treatment) is defined, in a similar manner to this thesis, as a household having 
purchased at least one product from a PDS Fair Price Shop during the period of the survey. In his 
estimation of the effect, Titah employs what is known as the Propensity Score Matching method 
(PSM), which is the construction of a control group counterfactual on the basis of a binary logit 
or probit regression of the treatment dummy variable on various household characteristics. The 
resulting propensity score for each household is used as a gauge of its suitability as a 
counterfactual control against which the outcomes for treatment (participant) households can be 
compared. As this method is employed in this thesis also, it will be described in more theoretical 
and practical detail in the next section. The outcome variable which Titah is examining is the 
share of food expenditure in total expenditure, and he finds that the treatment households increase 
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their food expenditure share regressively by income quantile. That is, the poorest increase their 
food expenditure share by 7.1%, while the less poor of the poor increase their share by 2.7%. 
Controlling for income levels and pre-treatment shares, he then estimates the increase in food 
consumption, and finds that the mean impact of the subsidy on food consumption is even greater 
than the value of the subsidy. He does not, however, go into the specifics of the diet composition 
or changes in overall caloric intake, as this thesis intends. Thus, the overall impact on food 
security in terms of the reduction of undernutrition remains unclear from the results, given the 
possibility of nutritionally-adverse shifts in diet composition due to the interaction of substitution 
and income effects described previously.  
 Cunha‟s study is an analysis of the relative effect on food consumption of in-kind transfers 
versus cash-transfers in the context of Mexico‟s Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL), or Food 
Support Program. PAL consists of direct food transfers, in the form of a specially designed 
nutritious food basket, to poor households. Cunha wishes to ascertain whether this type of in-kind 
transfer actually serves to increase food consumption, caloric intake, or general nutrition when 
compared to an equal-valued cash transfer. This kind of research is especially valuable given the 
ambiguity of the exact difference between the two types of transfer implied by the theory of 
consumer demand outlined above, in particular when the PAL transfer is inframarginal in terms 
of total food expenditure, as is in fact the case. In his evaluation, he uses data collected from a 
randomised control trial conducted at program roll-out. Households were randomly selected from 
targeted villages and given either an in-kind transfer, a cash transfer (scaled up by Cunha in his 
estimation as the absolute value is slightly less) or no transfer. This type of trial yields the most 
accurate data possible, as the randomisation process automatically constructs a valid 
counterfactual control group (the group that did not receive the transfer), whose observable and 
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unobservable characteristics are statistically expected to conform to those of the treatment groups 
prior to treatment (unfortunately, the same cannot strictly be said of natural experiment settings 
like those contained in household surveys). Thus the treatment effect is a relatively simple matter 
of comparing means between the two groups. After doing so, Cunha concludes that PAL in-kind 
transfers do not increase or decrease food consumption relative to equal-valued cash transfers. 
The overall effect on the two treatment groups is significantly positive in terms of food 
consumption, particularly in terms of cereals, fruit and vegetables, while being positive but not 
significantly different from zero in terms of caloric intake. Thus it appears once again that neither 
an increase in purchasing power, nor an increase in total food consumption, necessarily results 
directly in increased caloric intake.  
 The research carried out by McKenzie (2004) and Wood et al (2010) has a slightly different 
focus, but still very relevant to this thesis.  Instead of looking at the welfare, expenditure or 
nutritional effects of specific subsidy programs, they are instead concerned with how demand for 
specific goods changes with price amongst different socioeconomic groups. McKenzie confines 
this analysis to corn tortilla products, an important staple in Mexico, while Wood et al take a 
broader look at the income and price elasticities of different goods in order that welfare effects of 
price changes may be better estimated. McKenzie uses the four ENIGH datasets running from 
1994 to 2000, taking the 1995 peso crisis as a source of exogenous price variation from which to 
better calculate the price and income elasticities of tortilla products. He is specifically looking for 
Giffen behaviour in tortilla consumption, where income effects from a price increase actually 
cause a corresponding increase in the consumption of the good. Wood et al estimate a demand 
system for multiple goods (tortillas included) from cross-sectional variation within a single 
survey, ENIGH 2006, using a PIGLOG specification of the demand function. Overall, their 
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combined results suggest that the Diconsa subsidisation of multiple staple goods could potentially 
induce a significant increase in caloric intake. McKenzie finds tortillas to be an inferior good 
(their consumption decreases with income) but not a Giffen good, with a (compensated) price 
elasticity condtional on demographic composition of the household of -0.831. Wood at al., 
dividing their sample between urban and rural poor and non-poor, find tortillas to have almost 0 
(compensated) price elasticity at all income levels, implying that consumption levels are not 
sensitive to price changes once income effects are taken into account. The (compensated) 
elasticity estimates for other goods, however, are universally negative and significant, with 
cereals at -0.99 and meat at -0.41 for the rural poor subsample. The corresponding estimates of 
income elasticities for these two goods, for the same group, are 0.73 and 0.92. As the Diconsa 
program concentrates heavily on reducing the price of cereals, the most calorie-dense food group, 
these estimates make it reasonable to imagine an increase in consumption of cereals through 
combined substitution and income effects, and thus calories, amongst target households. The 
cross-price elasticities are not provided, however, and thus no definite conclusions can be drawn 
here. 
Jensen & Miller  
Of all the studies reviewed here, Jensen & Miller‟s (2008) paper, „Do Consumer Price 
Subsidies Really Improve Nutrition?‟ is the most meticulous and relevant in terms of 
methodology and results respectively. This study is one of two related research papers from the 
same authors that use data from a randomized control trial conducted in China that takes the 
urban-poor - households on considerably less than a dollar per person per day - as the subjects of 
an experiment to examine the precise effects of a staple food subsidy on the caloric intake of 
treatment households. The total sample size was 1,300 households, selected from two regions in 
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China and randomized into control and treatment groups. For five months, the treatment 
households were issued a daily voucher entitling them to certain discounts (three different  
subsidy levels) on the primary staple good of the region in question, rice or wheat flour. Through 
detailed daily consumption diaries, and three in-house interviews, the authors were able to 
precisely estimate the relative increase in caloric intake between treatment and control 
households. Controlling for regional, time and other non-related effects, the authors found no 
significant increase in caloric intake in either region, and even a slight but significant decrease in 
the less poor of the two regions. This result was due, at least in part, to the behaviour that was the 
subject of Jensen & Miller‟s second paper on the same experiment, „Giffen Behavior and 
Subsistence Consumption‟ (Jensen & Miller, 2008b), where they found that consumption of the 
staple in the less poor of the two regions conformed to the classic definition of a „Giffen good‟, 
specifically that households decreased their consumption of the staple in response to the price 
decrease. Overall, Jensen & Miller‟s paper provide a benchmark for studies of this kind, given 
the well-controlled environment in which the study was carried out, the duration of the 
experiment and the availability of consumption rather than purchase data. With household survey 
data like the ENIGH, despite the vastly increased sample size, it is simply not possible to control 
for possibly numerous unobservable factors in this manner, or to extract such exact estimates. 
However, given certain assumptions and methodological approaches, it is hoped that the 
remainder of this thesis can provide at least a plausible account of the caloric intake effect of the 
Diconsa subsidy program. 
3) Methodology 
3.1 Description of data: estimating calorie counts 
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The Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de Hogares (ENIGH) surveys are conducted by the 
National Mexican Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) every two years. Data is 
collected at household and individual level on demographics, employment and detailed 
expenditure and income specifics. Total sample size in 2010 was 27,632 households. Households 
are sorted into basic sampling units consisting of (mean) 13 households, which are then 
themselves grouped into larger units according to predefined geographic areas, referred to as 
„sampling design strata‟, each containing (mean) 322 households. Each basic sampling unit is 
given a sampling weight according to that unit‟s importance in terms of the total Mexican 
population, which is integrated into the dataset and thus taken into account in estimating the 
appropriate OLS and matching models. Separate from this survey design stratification, each 
household is identified by its location within a particular municipality within a particular federal 
state. There are 2,438 municipalities in Mexico, making the average population per municipality 
approximately 45,000 people.  
As part of the household expenditure section of the survey, each household is required to 
detail its daily expenditures on food items over a one week period. These food items are each 
identified with a code referring to a table of 242 different items divided into the following 14 
categories: cereals, meats, fish, milk, sugars & sweeteners, milk and derivatives, tubers, eggs, 
vegetables, fruit, coffee, tea & chocolate, spices & condiments, drinks and other foods. In 
addition to these in-house expenditures, all expenditures on food consumed outside the home are 
also recorded, although the particular food item being purchased is not recorded. Expenditures on 
food for animals are recorded as a separate category. Included with each expenditure observation 
are the day of purchase, amount purchased (kg), form of payment and place of purchase. For the 
first time in 2010, „Diconsa store‟ was listed as an option for this latter variable. This revision is 
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crucial for the purposes of this thesis, as it allows the identification of those households which 
shop at Diconsa stores as well as the calculation of calorie counts and total expenditures of the 
household‟s Diconsa food basket. In 2010, 1,584 of the 27,632 total households purchased at 
least one food item from a Diconsa store. Selected characteristics of Diconsa versus rural 
households are displayed in Table 1 below. As we can see, Diconsa households are relatively 
poor, with a mean income of $6.1 (Purchasing Power Parity 2010) per person per day, although 
this is still some way from the World Bank‟s threshold of $1 per person per day used identify the 
extremely poor, which make up 1.1% (321 households) of the total sample in this case. The vast 
majority are also located in rural areas, which is to be expected given the targeting objectives of 
the program. Given that 9% of the total sample (2,552 households) live on less than $4 a day and  
are located in rural areas, this would suggest that Diconsa is somewhat imperfectly targeted in 
terms of poverty, although it must also be recognised that this is not the sole targeting goal of the 
program, and also that the sample may not include those households in more remote areas. A 
mean of 2.4 for the 1-5 CONAPO index of marginalisation (1 being very highly marginalised) is 
also somewhat surprising, considering that Diconsa theoretically looks to target only high and 
very highly marginalised localities. A mean value of 3.6 for the formal education variable implies 
that heads of Diconsa households typically receive a secondary school education without 
attending university, which holds true for even the very poorest of the households in the sample 
(<$1 and <$2). Also worth pointing out is the higher proportion (36%) of indigenous households 
participating in the program compared to the proportion in the sample as a whole (14%). 
However, this is evidently due to the targeting criteria.   
In order to estimate nutrition effects of the program, each of the 242 food items was given 
a calorie per kilogram value. This value corresponds to those contained in the Table of 
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Composition of Foods for Central America provided by the Institute of Nutrition for Central 
America and Panama and the Pan-American Organisation for Health (INCAP & OPS, 2007), 
which gives detailed nutritional information for a huge variety of different foods within 20 
different categories. Despite this rich source of nutritional information, however, it must be 
pointed out that exact matches were not possible in a number of cases due to the relative lack of 
detail as to exact food types contained in the ENIGH. In these cases it was necessary to either 
select the median value of the calorie counts for all food items possibly corresponding to the less 
exact item as listed in the ENIGH, or to select the count of that item which was likely a much 
more common purchase. In the case of corn grain, for example, there is only a single item key 
listed in the ENIGH, although there are multiple types of corn. Here, the calorie per kilo count for 
white corn was selected, as it is by far the most common type of corn used for human 
consumption in Mexico.
11
 However, as in the vast majority of these cases, the calories between 
the different types varied only very slightly and the distorting effect on the subsequent analysis of 
selecting one or the other would have been negligible. Care was also taken to select only the 
uncooked value for all food types (both cooked and uncooked were listed in the tables) as they 
are purchased, as the increase in water content resulting from boiling will often decrease calorie 
per kilogram counts significantly.
12
 
After attaching the appropriate calorie counts to each food expenditure item, total caloric 
intake from each expenditure is obtained simply by multiplying the quantity purchased by the 
calorie count and total caloric intake for the household over the week-long survey period is 
obtained by summing these quantities. Here it is necessary to differentiate between food 
                                                             
11
 Agricultural Marketing Resource Center, 2011 
12 Note that this is per kilo, with the added weight of water, and does not affect the total nutrition for the 
household of the quantity purchased 
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purchased from outside sources like Diconsa stores, and non-monetary food expenditures, such as 
consumption from a household‟s own business or direct in-kind transfers to poor households such 
as those through the Liconsa program, which are included in the survey in a separate category. 
Due to the inherent difficulties of accurately estimating market prices and thus equivalent 
monetary expenditures for these items, as well as the fact that the focus of this thesis is on 
subsidies in a market framework, all total household nutrition (THN) values  in this paper (with 
the exception of that in Table 1 below) are those obtained solely from outside purchases. Of 
course, recognising that nutrition may come from consumption of food that is grown or produced 
by the household itself, the necessary care is taken to ascertain whether agricultural households 
are more or less likely to shop at Diconsa stores, as this would distort both matching and OLS 
estimates . Including the appropriate regressors in probit regressions in the latter part of the paper 
shows that these „autoconsuming‟ types of households are not, in fact, either less or more likely 
to shop at Diconsa stores. Another key point with regard to the total nutrition estimates is the 
presence of outliers in the sample. Looking at the maximum calorie per person per day value of 
75,110 for the Diconsa households in Table 1, for example, it is clear that this is not a realistic 
reflection of actual daily caloric intake. It is more likely that the household in question is 
purchasing large quantities of food for storage to be consumed over a much longer time period. 
The reverse may be said for the minimum value of 15 calorie per person per day. It is difficult, 
however, to adequately define what constitutes an outlier in this context, as detailed food 
consumption diaries are not kept. For this reason, and because of the logical statistical 
expectation that low and high outliers should be balanced across the sample, outliers are retained. 
Dummy variables for the frequency of food purchases for each household are also included in the 
econometric models to try and control for these outliers.  
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Up to this point, „nutrition‟ has been used synonymously with „caloric intake‟. This is 
clearly a very simplified view of what nutrition really means, as a genuinely nutritious diet may 
be very different from a high calorie diet.  There are many different dietary components that are 
necessary to stave off disease and ensure healthy phsyical development, and of these calories are 
only one. Moreover, calories come from different sources (fats, carbohydrates etc.) and the  
` Table 1: Characteristics of Diconsa vs Rural households 
      DICONSA           RURAL     
  
# 
HH Mean Std. Err Min Max   
# 
HH Mean Std. Err Min Max 
    
    
  
    
  
Nutrition per person per day 1584 2518.9 3497.7 14.86 75110   4173 2162 2621.3 0 75110 
 
  
    
  
    
  
Locality size * 1584 3.69 0.71 1 4   6123 4 0 4 4 
 
  
    
  
    
  
Household (HH) population 1584 4.51 2.31 1 21   6123 4.3 2.21 1 21 
 
  
    
  
    
  
Dollars per person per day 1584 6.08 8.46 0.19 156.3   6123 7.13 10.54 0.12 262.2 
 
  
    
  
    
  
CONAPO** 1584 2.4 1.2 1 5   6123 2.65 1.28 1 5 
 
  
    
  
    
  
Education of HH head*** 1584 3.62 1.95 1 11   6123 3.73 2.02 1 11 
 
  
    
  
    
  
Indigenous proportion 1584 0.39 0.49 0 1   6123 0.29 0.45 0 1 
 
                      
 
*1=City, 2=Small town, 3=Large town, 4=Rural  **1=Very highly marginalisation, ... , 5=Very low marginalisation  ***1=No schooling, ... , 12=Phd 
 
restriction of one‟s diet to one of these particular nutrients is potentially hazardous to health. 
However, as a measure of energy content and thus essential to the prevention of undernutrition, a 
diet with sufficient caloric content is vital for those living in poverty. For this reason, the WHO 
and FAO both use caloric intake per capita as the primary measure of the food situation in poor 
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countries. The degree and prevalence of caloric intake deficiencies amongst the poor in the 
ENIGH sample is summarised in the next section, where it is demonstrated that there is 
considerable scope for improvement in Mexico in this regard. Although it would have been 
possible to include all nutrients from the INCAP/OPS tables in this analysis, there is simply not 
enough space to do so. Therefore, this study follows Jensen & Miller (2008a), Kochar (2005) and 
Cunha (2010) in focusing on caloric intake as a proxy measure of nutritional benefit.   
3.2  Estimating Treatment Effects 
Restated for clarification, the primary hypothesis that this thesis seeks to test is that the 
Diconsa program imparts significant nutritional benefits, in terms of caloric intake, to participant 
households. The confirmation or rejection of this hypothesis is dependent on a sound estimation 
of what is known as the Average Treatment effect on the Treated, or ATT. Specifically, this is the 
difference, for the average Diconsa treated household, between total household nutrition (THN) 
with the subsidy and THN without the subsidy. The problem here with cross-sectional data like 
the ENIGH, however, is that the THN outcome with the subsidy is all that is observed for 
treatment households. The basic problem that is faced in testing this hypothesis then, given the 
type of data (non-experimental) that is being used, is constructing the counter-factual control 
group against which total household nutrition (THN) of Diconsa treatment households may be 
compared (Blundell & Dias, 2008). It is clearly not sufficient to simply define the control group 
as the rest of the sample, as THN is determined by multiple factors such as income, household 
size, wealth, demographic composition, rural or urban location, and others which are not 
necessarily evenly balanced between Diconsa treatment households and the rest of the sample, 
thus corrupting the estimate of ATT. Therefore, it is necessary to condition on these observable 
characteristics, working on the assumption that once these – possibly numerous - factors are 
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controlled for, pre-treatment THN for observed Diconsa treated households corresponds to that of 
observed untreated households. This is called selection on observables, as opposed to 
unobservables, which, if present and confounding, are impossible to control for by their very 
nature without a fully randomized experiment setting. Hence, the three separate but related 
methodological approaches which are now outlined are essentially different means of 
constructing the counterfactual control group by conditioning solely on observable 
characteristics. These three approaches are as follows:  
1) Robust OLS regression of total household nutrition (THN) on a binary Diconsa 
treatment variable and a vector X of selected control variables using the ENIGH 2010 
dataset 
2) Comparison of THN means of Diconsa treatment group and a control group selected 
by the PSM method, using the ENIGH 2010 dataset 
3) Robust OLS regression of THN on an adjusted, municipal-level, exogenous Diconsa 
treatment variable and a vector X of selected control variables using an augmented 
ENIGH 2010 & 2008 dataset.  
Of these three approaches, the first serves as a preliminary investigation into the determinants of 
nutritional intake at the household level, with the coefficient of the Diconsa treatment variable as 
an initial estimate of the ATT. The PSM method, by constructing an (identifiable) control group 
by conditioning on the propensity score, is taken as a more reliable estimate of the ATT and also 
allows further comparisons between the specifics of control and treatment outcomes. The third 
approach is intended as an estimate of the ATT in a wider context and a further robustness check, 
by constructing a treatment variable which captures the regional intensity of the program rather 
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than a simplistic binary (yes or no) assignment to treatment at the household level. What now 
follows is a theoretical outline of these three approaches.  
3.2.1  OLS regression with binary household-level treatment  
In order to obtain an initial estimate of the treatment effect against which PSM and the 
augmented dataset regression can be compared, the following simple regression model is run on 
the ENIGH dataset:  
𝑻𝑯𝑵𝒊  =  𝛂 + 𝛃 ∗ 𝐗𝐢 + 𝛄 ∗ 𝐃𝐢𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐚𝐢 +  𝛜𝐢 
where the i subscript indexes households, THN is total household nutrition calculated as 
described in section 3.1, X is a vector of household-level control variables, Diconsa is a dummy 
treatment variable taking on the value 1 if the household in question purchased at least one 
product from a Diconsa store and 0 otherwise, and  ϵ  is the error term. The coefficient vector of 
variables in the X vector, β, serves to absorb the observable variation in the dependent variable 
THN that is determined solely by the various household characteristics in X such as demographic 
composition, geographic location and income, leaving the  γ coefficient theoretically free to 
capture the effect of Diconsa treatment conditional on X. γ thus represents the desired ATT 
estimate – the change in household caloric intake due to Diconsa treatment. 
This estimation of the treatment effect γ is treated as preliminary only for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, in addition to the other classical assumptions behind OLS models, it assumes that 
all regressors in the vector X are exogenous, that is, there is no two-way interaction between the 
right hand side covariates and the dependent variable THN: E(ϵ   X = 0. This assumption may 
not strictly hold for all regressors, as caloric intake can clearly influence certain household 
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characteristics such as working hours. Secondly, the correct functional form (possibly including 
higher order terms) is not exactly known. Thirdly, estimation of the treatment effect using this 
method treats all observations in the sample as equally weighted in terms of calculating the ATT, 
resulting in a less precise estimate (Blundell & Dias, 2008). Finally, this method of estimation 
does not allow the identification of a specific control group, which will be necessary if further 
investigation is to be carried out into the channels of consumer behaviour through which the ATT 
is realized.  
3.2.2 PSM matching 
For the purposes of this thesis, the PSM method of estimating the ATT is preferred because it 
avoids these potentially confounding aspects of the simplistic OLS regression approach with our 
sample. PSM is used in economic policy evaluation for a variety of different outcomes in a 
variety of different settings, particularly where the ideal randomized control trial approach is not 
feasible (Tritah, 2004, Conniffe et al, 2000, Pufahl et al, 2009). PSM entails the identification of 
an appropriate control group within the sample by means of probit regression of the binary 
Diconsa treatment dummy on the determining X vector of observable household characteristics. 
This regression generates a set of coefficients corresponding to each variable within the X vector 
which allows the calculation of a propensity score for each individual household. This propensity 
score is a measure of the particular household‟s propensity to participate in the Diconsa program, 
i.e. to receive treatment, even if assignment to treatment is not actually observed. It is thus a 
function of X which represents the probability of treatment conditional on the particular observed 
values of the variables in X:  
𝑷𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊 = Pr(𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒊 = 1 | 𝑿𝒊) 
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Once the propensity score is calculated, treatment households are then matched, using various 
algorithms, to an untreated household, or households, with a similar propensity score, which then 
serves as a control with which to compare the observed THN. The algorithms used for the 
matching process in this these are Kernel matching, Nearest Neighbor matching and Stratification 
matching.
13
 The ATT is then taken as the propensity score weighted mean of all differences 
between treated households and controls. In this way, the equal weighting problem of the simple 
OLS model is overcome.  
There are a number of theoretical assumptions behind the PSM method. Firstly, given the 
propensity score P(X), we have: 
Diconsa ⊥ X | P(X) 
That is, given the propensity score P(X), theoretical assignment to treatment – the probability of 
purchasing at least one product from a Diconsa store – is independent of the observed values of 
the X vector (Becker & Ichino). This property is known as the balancing property and in practical 
calculations amounts to balancing the means of the different variables within the X vector 
between control and treatment groups. Another important assumption is that of 
unconfoundedness given the propensity score: 
𝑻𝑯𝑵𝟏,𝑻𝑯𝑵𝟎 ⊥ 𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂 | 𝐏(𝐗) 
This assumption is essentially the statement that, given the propensity score, Diconsa-treated 
households as observed would have the same non-treatment THN outcome as the observed non-
treated households, and vice-versa. Note that this condition requires that the selected X variables 
simultaneously determine the outcome THN conditional on treatment, as well as the treatment 
                                                             
13
 For a fuller explanation of these methods, see Becker & Inchino (2002) or Blundell & Dias (2008) 
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variable Diconsa (Blundell & Dias, 2008). This, combined with the balancing property, allow the 
artificial counterfactual to be constructed from the ENIGH sample, with the ATT defined as 
follows: 
ATT = E { E {𝑻𝑯𝑵𝟏𝒊|𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒊= 1, P(𝑿𝒊 } − E{𝑻𝑯𝑵𝟎𝒊|𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒊= 0, P(𝑿𝒊)} | 𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒊 = 1} 
where the subscript 1 denotes treatment and 0 denotes no treatment, and E signifies expectation, 
in this case the mean value. For the investigation into differences in household behaviour that 
follows, the control group within the sample is then taken to be either the entire matched non-
treated group using the Nearest Neighbour matching method, or a sample of non-treated 
households gathered around the treatment group propensity score mean. 
3.2.3 OLS regression with adjusted Diconsa treatment at municipal level 
Because the two methodological approaches described above depend on the identification of 
Diconsa treatment at the household level, both estimations of the ATT are obtained from the 
2010 ENIGH dataset only, as it is the 2010 revision of the questionnaire that included „Diconsa‟ 
as an option for „place of purchase‟. However, because purchasing an item in a Diconsa outlet is 
essentially a voluntary decision at the household-level, the estimates obtained from both 
approaches are potentially subject to distortion as a result of what is known as „self-selection‟. 
Self-selection occurs in this type of program because the decision to purchase subsidized food 
commodities - to assign oneself to treatment – may very well be the result of unobservable 
factors as well as observables. While the intention of conditioning on the X vector of 
characteristics is to attempt to remove variation in THN that is unrelated to the treatment, this 
cannot account for the self-selection effect if present. Thus, for this second OLS model, the 
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 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒊𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒂 𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒋 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒕 
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒋
  
∗ (𝑹𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊) 
With the full model specification, for a household i in municipality j at time t, being: 
𝑻𝑯𝑵𝒊𝒋𝒕  =  𝛂 + 𝛃 ∗ 𝐗𝐢 + 𝛄 ∗ 𝐃𝐢𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐚𝐢𝐣𝐭 + 𝛑 ∗ 𝐑𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥𝐢 +  𝛉 ∗ 𝐓𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐭 + 𝛜𝐣 
Where 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖  is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the household i is located in a locality 
with a population of less than 2,500 people – the targeted locations of the Diconsa program – and 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the household is from the 2010 survey and 0 
if it is from 2008. Because the possibility of treatment within a municipality decreases with the 
amount of potentially eligible localities, holding the number of Diconsa stores fixed, the 
treatment variable is adjusted to represent the probability of there being a Diconsa store in a 
particular household‟s locality. This is necessary due to the nature of the dataset, where 
household-specific location is only recorded at the municipal level, although a variable denoting 
the size of the locality is included. To further conform to the Diconsa targeting policy, the 
adjusted treatment variable is next split into multiple parts with interaction terms, a time dummy 
household-level size of locality dummies and municipality-level marginalization dummies. The 
full specification thus becomes: 
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𝐤=𝟏 ) + 𝛉 ∗ 𝐓𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐭 +  𝛜𝐣  
This specification allows the use of the augmented dataset without the need for household level 
identification of treatment, as well as taking into account possible self-selection bias at the 
household level by using an exogenous source of variation in the intensity of treatment.  
 While the three approaches outlined are utilized in the estimation of the ATT, I will also 
be looking more closely at various aspects of consumer behaviour within different income 
quantiles and between treated and control groups. The methodology behind most of this 
secondary analysis is relatively simple, and any minor points are made as the results are 
presented. All estimation and secondary analysis is carried out using Stata version 11.1. 
 
4) Results 
The empirical results of this thesis will be presented as follows: 
1) Preliminary analysis of consumer demand behaviour and household caloric deficit in 
Mexico 
2) Results of the basic OLS model using the ENIGH 2010 dataset with analysis 
3) Results of PSM approach with analysis 
4) Results of the adjusted OLS model with augmented ENIGH 2010 & 2008 dataset with 
analysis 
4.1  Household Demand for Food 
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Before estimating the ATT, it is beneficial to attempt to paint a general picture of 
household demand for food in Mexico, in terms of expenditure and calories. Figure 1 below 
shows the average food basket, in terms of expenditure, of households in the ENIGH sample as 
divided into five income quantiles of dollar income (2010 PPP) per person per day.  
Figure 1. Food expenditure by income quantile  
 
A number of trends are immediately evident. First, overall expenditure on food increases with 
income. The proportion of income spent on food, however, decreases with income. This 
relationship, known as the Engle curve, is more clearly depicted in Figure 2. Thus, the Diconsa 
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program, and in general any food subsidy program, is always proportionally more beneficial to 
the poor if we view the subsidy solely as an income transfer.  
Figure 2. Engel curve – food share by income quantile  
 
Secondly, expenditure on food consumed outside the house (food outside) increases rapidly with 
income. This is important for this analysis, as the exact caloric composition of outside food 
expenditure is not known and is thus excluded from THN calculations. Thirdly, the income 
elasticity of meat, milk, fruit, drinks and „other foods‟ appears from this graphical analysis to be 
positive, with expenditure noticeably increasing with income. Vegetables, surprisingly, appear to 
be weakly inferior goods across the entire sample if we confine ourselves to in-house 
expenditure, but the unknown composition of outside food expenditure makes drawing any 
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certain conclusions here impossible. The relationship between expenditure on cereals and income 
seems to be slightly more complex, with the maximum expenditure found in the second poorest 
quantile on less than $6.5 dollars per day (DPD). This has possible implications for the Diconsa 
program, given that the mean DPD of the Diconsa treated group falls within this quantile (Table 
1). Overall, however, what stands out is the lack of over-reliance on a single or even two food 
groups, with substantial expenditure on cereals, meat and vegetables even in the lowest income 
quantile. This suggests that there is considerable scope for substitution amongst the different food 
groups, and thus the overall price effect of a food subsidy on the composition of the food basket 
is by no means certain.  
Figure 3 depicts the caloric composition of the food basket by the same income quantiles. Once 
again, it must be emphasized that the caloric composition of the outside food basket is unknown, 
and thus it is the relationship between expenditure and calories within the food groups that is 
most informative. The contribution of cereals to total caloric intake at lower income levels is 
clear, ignoring outside food expenditure, but it is not directly proportional to expenditure. This 
suggests that at lower income levels, households tend to substitute towards cereal types with high 
calorie counts, namely corn products such as corn grain, corn flour and corn tortilla, as well as 
rice grain to a lesser degree. Figure 4 shows this relationship more clearly.. Consumers display 
an increasing tendency to substitute towards more expensive foods with desirable characteristics 
other than the amount of energy they provide, such as taste. These are the extra components of 
the food utility function described by Zazazig & Adams (1996) and French (2003), which appear 
to take on more importance as income increases. This is of course intuitively understandable, as 
subsistence concerns of the average household will naturally dissipate once above a certain 
income threshold. The trend is particularly pronounced for the cereals food group, although it is  
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Figure 3. Calorie baskets by income quantile  
 
present in all groups with the exception of vegetables, whose nutritional value is not best 
represented by caloric content. This aspect of household behaviour supports the idea that food 
subsidy programs which seek to increase caloric intake should focus on calorie-dense, staple 





Figure 4. Calorie per peso by income quantile  
 
 
The aim of diet manipulation is primarily to increase caloric intake in order to reduce the 
incidence of undernutrition. If there is not initially a problem of undernutrition in the targeted 
region, however, this aim is rather redundant. Households are more likely to restrict their 
consumption of calorie-intensive foods to the minimum level required to fulfil caloric basic 
requirements, while using the remaining extra income to purchase foods more desirable in terms 
of other characteristics, to add variety to the diet or possibly to purchase other, non-food items. 
With this in mind, the caloric deficit of rural households surveyed in the ENIGH was calculated 
at different income levels, in order to ascertain whether the explicitly stated goal of the Diconsa 
program to improve household nutrition is justified. The caloric need was estimated by 
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decomposing the demographics of each household into 12 different age/sex categories (Appendix 
III) and multiplying the total household population in each category by the corresponding 
recommended calorie intake per day value contained in the tables provided by the National 
Mexican Institute of Nutrition (INN, 1983). Total household nutrition per day, non-monetary 
expenditures included, was then subtracted from this value and divided by the total household 
population. Only households with zero outside food expenditure were included in the calculation, 
while Diconsa households were excluded. It must be noted that the estimate of caloric deficit as 
calculated by this method is extremely noisy – varying substantially - throughout the sample and 
hence this can be taken as rough approximation only without much more detailed data. The 
results in cumulative population terms are displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2. Caloric deficits per person per day  








   








4.5547   
  








4.7307   
  








4.701   
  








4.173   
  








6.4022   
  








5.6168   
  








2.7968   
        
         
From these estimates, there is at least suggestive evidence of a significant and increasing 
caloric deficit amongst the rural population as we restrict ourselves to progressively lower 
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income levels, although it appears to be substantially less than the >500 deficit found by Jensen 
& Miller (2008a) in their sample of the extremely poor in China. However, the particular 
distribution of the deficit amongst the household members may not be equal, which can 
compound the problem of undernutrition (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988a). Thus it seems to be 
reasonable to suppose that there is at least some scope for improvement in caloric intake in the 
regions targeted by Diconsa. 
4.2 Household-level OLS regressions 
 The results of the preliminary OLS regression with the binary Diconsa treatment variable 
are displayed in Figure 5, with various controls and robust standard errors. Diconsa treatment in 
this case is defined as the household purchasing at least one item from a Diconsa store over the 
period of the survey. The result is robust, however, to defining treatment as purchasing at least 10 
items from a Diconsa store, or as purchasing at least two different items on different days, with 
the estimate actually increasing in both these cases. It is also robust to arbitrary specifications of 
the standard error and the weighting of the regression according to the survey sampling weights, 
as well as transformation into per-capita terms and log-log specification. The treatment effect 
estimate of a 13,397 increase in calories per household per week is approximately equivalent to 
425 calories per person per day in Diconsa households. If accurate, this increase would on 





Figure 5. OLS regression of THN with ENIGH 201014 (source: author’s calculations) 
                          
  
      
Total HH nutrition 
   
  
  Diconsa dummy   -   13401.3***   13379.5***   13421.1***   13397.9***   
          (1530.4)   (1530.6)   (1525.1)   (1525.2)   
  HH size   1693.4***   3155.7***   1693.0***   3180.2***   1685.4***   
  
 
  (363.1)   (216.4)   (361.6)   (215.8)   (361.5)   
  HH income   0.0922***   0.0909***   0.0912***   0.0934***   0.0936***   
  
 
  (0.0103)   (0.0105)   (0.0104)   (0.0104)   (0.0104)   
  HH income sqr.   -9.06e-08***   -8.70e-08***   -8.83e-08***   -9.11e-08***   -9.23e-08*** 
  
 
  (1.74E-08)   (1.86E-08)   (1.80E-08)   (1.82E-08)   (1.75E-08)   
  Female head of HH dummy   -1034.2*   -1257.7**   -1086.2*   -1214.5**   -1040.0*   
  
 
  (439.9)   (441.8)   (439.9)   (439.0)   (437.2)   
  Age of HH head    395.3***   459.1***   402.1***   456.7***   398.4***   
  
 
  (68.05)   (67.29)   (67.94)   (67.08)   (67.72)   
  Age of HH head sqr.   -3.398***   -4.100***   -3.556***   -4.000***   -3.444***   
  
 
  (0.694)   (0.685)   (0.692)   (0.683)   (0.689)   
  Outside food exp.   -0.690***   -0.692***   -0.696***   -0.681***   -0.685***   
  
 
  (0.0944)   (0.0953)   (0.0949)   (0.0948)   (0.0944)   
  Outside food exp. sqr.   0.0000116**   0.0000113**   0.0000112**   0.0000115**   0.0000114** 
  
 
  (4E-06)   (4E-06)   (4E-06)   (4E-06)   (4E-06)   
  Total HH hours worked   12.67*   21.20***   15.06**   20.34***   14.08*   
  
 
  (5.758)   (5.538)   (5.752)   (5.517)   (5.733)   
  Total HH repair hours   77.42**   79.51**   72.31**   81.31**   73.91**   
  
 
  (27.6)   (27.75)   (27.73)   (27.56)   (27.53)   
  Total HH housework hours   56.23***   58.96***   57.00***   57.78***   55.75***   
  
 
  (9.502)   (9.452)   (9.486)   (9.414)   (9.449)   
  Total HH liked hours   14.18**   22.73***   16.60**   20.80***   14.52**   
  
 
  (5.114)   (4.915)   (5.104)   (4.912)   (5.101)   
  HH members w/ health probs   1471.5***   1438.6***   1475.2***   1397.8***   1434.7***   
  
 
  (208.3)   (208.1)   (207)   (208.0)   (207.0)   
  Constant term   3679.7   3205.6   4286.2   700.3   1764.3   
  
 
  (2210.5)   (2209.4)   (2193.9)   (2206.2)   (2193.0)   
  Diconsa       x   x   x   x   
  CONAPO controls   X   x   x   x   x   
  Locality size controls   X   x   x   x   x   
  Demographic controls   X   
 
  x   
 
  x   




  x   x   
  # Observations   24555   24555   24555   24555   24555   
  adj. R-sq   0.153   0.156   0.157   0.161   0.162   
                                                             
14
   ***significant at >0.1% ** significant at >1% * significant at >5% (standard errors in paretheses) 
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The coefficients of the remaining variables are also informative with regard to the 
determinants of total nutrition intake. Total household population is understandably significant 
and positive. The linear income term is significant and positive in the standard model, as 
expected, while the opposite sign and significance of the squared term suggests that THN levels 
out at a certain level of income as the household surpasses the subsistence threshold. Solving for 
income at the maximum of the quadratic function gives a value roughly equal to the maximum 
income in the sample – caloric intake is a concave function of income. The signs and significance 
of the linear and squared terms of the age of the head of household imply that, in terms of 
securing a sufficiently nutritious diet for household members, an older household head is 
important up to a certain point.  Outside food expenditure is significant, and negative, with the 
coefficient on the linear variable suggesting a relatively poor calorie-to-peso ratio for outside 
food expenditure of 9.5 (deflated from quarterly to weekly expenditure) for the sample as a 
whole. The household activity hours are all positive and significant in varying degrees, with 
housework and „liked activity‟ hours being the most important determinants. As mentioned 
previously, however, these regressors are possibly endogenous. The same can be said for the 
number of people with health problems in the household, given that it is significant and positive. 
The food purchase frequency controls are intended to account for the difficulties in accurately 
capturing the typical THN of all households in a week-long survey, as the true THN for those 
households making only monthly food purchases, for example, is likely to be more than what is 
recorded during this short time frame. Over the entire sample, however, it is statistically 





4.3 PSM matching 
In the first stage of the PSM method, as outlined in the methodology section, a propensity 
score function is estimated using, in this case, a probit regression. The results of this regression 
can be found in Appendix IV. The set of X regressors from the previous OLS regression is 
modified so that the balancing property may be satisfied, and the pseudo R2 value suggests that 
31% of the variation in assignment to Diconsa treatment is explained. The mean p-score for the 
treatment group is 0.21 and 0.04 for the non-treated group. The results of the PSM estimation of 
the ATT are displayed below in Table 3.  
Table 3. PSM ATT estimates (per week) with ENIGH 2010  




   
  
  
    










      
    












      
    










      
    
              
 
        










      
    










      
    










      
    
              
 
        










      
    












      
    






2075.809 4.931   




Using three different matching algorithms (Kernel, Nearest Neighbour and Stratification) to add 
robustness to the results, it appears the ATT as estimated by PSM over the full sample is similar 
to that obtained by simple OLS. That is, compared to the control group as identified by the 
propensity score, those households which purchase subsidised food commodities from Diconsa 
outlets seem on the whole to have a diet which is much higher in energy content, with a low 
estimate of 12,977 per household per week (411 added calories per person per day), and a high 
estimate of 13,561 (430 added calories per person per day). Assuming unconfoundedness of pre-
treatment outcomes, this result stands in marked contrast to the results of the previously reviewed 
studies by Kochar (2005), Cunha (2010) and Jensen & Miller (2008a), and implies that the 
Diconsa subsidies do in fact impart significant nutritional benefits to those who participate. 
However, a note of caution in interpreting these estimates must be introduced here, for reasons 
explained shortly.  
As a robustness check, two further PSM estimations are carried out on restricted samples 
consisting of a) only households with no outside food expenditure and b) only Diconsa 
households and households in municipalities with no Diconsa store. The latter restriction is made 
possible by utilizing the INEGI dataset on municipality services (INEGI, 2009, 2007). Restriction 
a) is intended to minimize the possible effect of hidden calorie consumption in outside food 
expenditure, which might distort the estimate if the outside food expenditure of Diconsa 
households is on average less than the control group. Restriction b) is intended to reinforce the 
unconfoundedness of pre-treatment outcomes by confining the control candidates to those 
households which are exogenously deprived of Diconsa treatment, rather than possibly 
voluntarily declining it. Restriction a) actually causes the ATT estimates to marginally increase in 
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the case of the stratification and kernel matching methods, while restriction b) causes a slight 
decrease, particularly using the stratification matching technique. This is possibly because of 
unobservables present in the full sample, making it conceivable that the vector of matching 
variables X cannot fully account for differences in THN. If this is the case, one would expect 
households in areas with no Diconsa store to be better off in general, and analysis of the survey 
data does indeed show that the vast majority (83%) of municipalities with no Diconsa store are in 
the „very low marginalisation‟ category. Even the low estimate with the b) restriction, however, 
equates to an increase of 280 calories per person per day. Results are also robust to varying 
specifications of the propensity score function as well as the alternative treatment variables 
described above.  
One important advantage of using the PSM method in this analysis was the construction 
of a control group within the sample which serves to compare consumption behaviour. This 
control group was defined a) as all non-treatment households matched to Diconsa households 
using the nearest neighbour matching method and b) as a group of 3,365 non-treatment 
households gathered around the mean propensity score of Diconsa households. In the analysis 
that follows there is no significant qualitative difference in results between these two definitions 
of the control group.  
Figure 6 below depicts the food baskets, in terms of expenditure, of the Diconsa and control 
groups. Overall, the differences in expenditure by food category are minor, with the most 
noticeable being the shift from expenditure on meat to cereals. It is worth stating here that overall 
food expenditure for the control and treatment groups is almost identical, with a statistically 
insignificant mean difference of 85 cents per week extra in the case of the Diconsa group 
households. The effect of treatment on food‟s share of expenditure – obtained as an outcome 
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variable from PSM – is statistically nil, with both the control and treatment groups spending 
approximately 50% of their available income on food. This result contrasts with that of Tritah 
(2004), who found a significant increase in food share for households „treated‟ by PDS Fair Price 
Shops in India.  
Figure 6. Food expenditure – Diconsa versus Control  
 
Figure 7 shows the difference in the caloric composition of the food baskets in the treatment and 
control groups. Once again, differences are relatively minor, with the important exception of the 
calorie share of cereals, which increases markedly in the Diconsa group. Subtracting the Diconsa 
calorie basket from that of the control, shown in Figure 8, allows us to see exactly where the 
extra calories are coming from. Interestingly, the majority of differences are minor, although 
likely greater in terms of other nutrients. The important exception is cereals, which accounts for 
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~10,000 extra calories per household per week, with cooking oils also bringing in a minor 
proportion of the extra calories. The universally positive calorie count of the different foods in 
the difference basket suggests that there may be substantial income as well as substitution effects. 
To investigate further, the savings, in terms of calorie per peso, of the Diconsa basket versus the 
market were calculated. These results are displayed in Figure 9. Prices in this case are calculated 
as (calorie count)/expenditure on each specific item, with the price per food category being a sum 
of expenditure-share-weighted prices from all items in that category. Both Diconsa and market 
prices are meaned at the municipal level. As we can see, while there appear to be substantial 
savings versus the market in the case of cereals and sugar & sweeteners, differences in other 
categories are minor or even negative in the case of fruit and other foods. Thus the increase in 
consumption (in caloric terms) of all categories cannot be solely explained  




Figure 8. Difference in Calorie Basket – Diconsa vs Control15  
 
Figure 9. Calorie per peso savings – Diconsa versus market 
 
                                                             
15
 See product key for Figure 10 
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by own-price (calorie-per-peso) effects, but must be explained in terms of an interaction between 
substitution and (significant) income effects. 
Comparing calorie-per-peso values of different food groups versus the same measure for 
the market is inherently problematic, however, given the fact that the composition of each 
category – in terms of specific items – is a quality choice on the part of the consumer and is 
unlikely to be based solely on relative caloric benefit. A basket that consists entirely of sweet 
wheat cakes, for example, is likely to have a much lower calorie-per-peso value than one that is 
composed only of raw corn grain. Thus the saving estimates are most likely somewhat overstated. 
To attempt to minimize this distortion, the savings versus the market of the 14 most frequent 
Diconsa purchases, in terms of specific items, were calculated in a similar fashion. These are 
displayed in Figure 10.  
Restricting ourselves to these specific items, it appears that the most highly subsidised food stuff 
is actually crisps (chips), although given the varying quality and range of brands available, this is 
quite likely to be a quality choice rather than a true reflection of the savings margin. Apart from 
crisps, there is a significant savings margin for calorie-dense products like raw corn grain, wheat 
flour and sweet bread. Considering the relative homogeneity of these products as obtained from 
different sources (with the possible exception of sweet bread), this can be taken as a more 
accurate estimate of the true savings margin. The increased calorie intake of the Diconsa 
households, however, depends on the consumer response to these savings, i.e. the interaction 
between the savings margin and consumer demand for the different products. Looking at Figure 
11, which displays the specific-item calorie basket of the Diconsa and control group, it is 
apparent that Diconsa households substitute heavily towards corn grain and (to a lesser extent) 
corn flour, while reducing their intake of corn tortilla. Thus it appears that the savings margin 
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inducing the most significant consumer response amongst the treatment households is that on 
corn grain, with various interactions between income and substitution effects accounting for the 
remaining basket changes. In fact (Figure 7), almost the entire caloric value of the Diconsa food 
basket is provided by cereals, in particular (Figure 11) raw corn grain. 
These are interesting results. Firstly, it appears that the potential problem of income effects 
overriding substitution effects for net zero or negative effect on caloric intake, as identified by 
numerous authors (Cunha, 2010, Jensen & Miller, 2008a, Kochar, 2005), is not present here. 






Figure 11. Specific calorie basket – Diconsa vs Control  
 
If this result is not confounded, it appears that the pattern of food subsidies as provided by 
Diconsa is a successful subsidy framework for increasing household nutrition in terms of 
calories, without overly reducing intake of other nutrients. Thus the possible criticism directed 
against the subsidisation of basic staples that increased caloric intake results at the expense of 
other nutrients (Valdis, 1988, Cunha, 2010), does not appear to apply here. Once again, these 
conclusions are at least partly subject to certain assumptions about the accuracy of ATT in terms 
of actual consumption, which are tested by the more in-depth analysis to follow. 
Further investigation into the increased consumption, or at least purchase, of raw corn grain by 
Diconsa households reveals further informative differences between households. Firstly, there is 
a total of only 309 households making raw corn grain purchases amongst the 1,564 Diconsa 
households. The mean purchase, in caloric terms, is 16,500 calories, significantly more than any 
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other commodity. Thus it appears that the Diconsa households are purchasing corn grain in bulk 
quantities, and that the majority of the ATT estimate is being driven by these bulk purchases of a 
relatively small proportion of the treated households. Indeed, running the OLS and PSM 
estimations on a restricted sample including only those households which have made no corn 
grain purchases in the survey period, reduces the estimate of the ATT substantially to ~3164, 
although it remains significant.   These estimates are displayed in Table 4.  
Table 4. PSM  estimates without corn grain households  
  Matching           ATT         




   
  
  
    












   
  
  
    
                        










   
  
  
    
                        








1062.391 2.977   
                        
 
There are two possible interpretations of these new estimates: 
a) Diconsa households restrict their purchases of corn to large bulk quantities, made 
infrequently, most likely because of the non-perishable nature of the foodstuff. Thus the 
week long survey has recorded these purchases only from those Diconsa households who 
have made these bulk purchases within the survey period. If true, this would not confound 
the estimate of the ATT, as the proportion of households making these purchases within 
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the time frame would be expected to correspond to the frequency with which these 
purchases are made. 
 
b) These bulk purchases of corn grain are intended for resale, rather than consumption by the 
household. This is a potentially major problem for the ATT estimate, as the measure of 
caloric intake could be heavily distorted by purchases not intended for consumption. 
Firstly, it is apparent that the Diconsa households which purchase grain are on average 
poorer than the Diconsa group as whole, with a mean of $4.61 dollars per person per day 
(DPPPD) versus $6.1 for the sample as a whole. Thus the ATT estimate at least for richer 
households is most likely overstated to some degree. Trimming the Diconsa group until 
the mean DPPPD corresponds to that of the corn grain households (dropping 440 
observations), the mean caloric deficit per person is ~( - 560) calories per person per day 
– equating to a substantial surplus. This surplus is over twice that of even the richest 
quantile (>$20 DPPPD) which registers a mean surplus of ~( - 280). This suggests that the 
quantities of corn grain purchased are not explained entirely by household nutrition needs, 
and lends some support to the notion that at least some of the estimate is distorted by bulk 
corn purchases which are not intended for household consumption, most likely being sold 
on the black market.  
The degree to which this reselling of subsidised commodities is carried out, and by which 
types of households is impossible to measure without improved data, and even then it would 
be extremely difficult, as any households surveyed are unlikely to willingly report, at least in 
exact detail, the reselling of subsidised corn grain to official sources. The fact that this 
evidence for reselling is present in the data despite the ENIGH survey questionnaire explicitly 
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stating that all food expenditure recorded in the 7-day diaries should be for household 
consumption underlines this point. Additionally, as Diconsa stores are essentially privately or 
community owned stores supplied rather than operated by the government, there may be a 
lack of adequate monitoring or restrictions on bulk purchases. The implications for the 
estimate of the ATT at the household level (approaches one and two) are potentially serious. 
Although the ATT estimate obtained through matching without-corn-grain households is still 
significant (although substantially reduced) the possibility that reselling of other food types 
also occurs must be recognised, potentially rendering the ATT estimate obtained by analysis 
of household expenditure data trivial, or even nil. It would be pessimistic, however, to 
suppose that the entire calorie surplus, in all food groups, observed in Diconsa households is 
resold. At least some nutritional benefit at the household-level is thus cautiously 
hypothesised. There is certainly no evidence for the subsidies causing a net decreases in 
caloric intake, as found by Jensen & Miller (2008a).  
4.4 Municipal-level OLS regressions 
Given the potential problems with the ATT estimate obtained through the basic OLS and 
PSM approaches outlined above, the adapted municipal/locality level OLS regression is 
informative. As described in section 3.2.3, the modified regression model was run on the 
augmented dataset consisting of the ENIGH 2010 & 2008 surveys. The results are displayed 




Table 5. OLS regression of THN of ENIGH 2010 & 200816  
            
Total HH 
nutrition       
                    
  Diconsa adjusted       9278.3**         
          (2879.4)         
  
Diconsa adj.*(V.high 
marg)           12248.4*   915.0 
              (5936.2)   (4097.8) 
  
Diconsa adj.*(High 
marg)           11368.7***   4802.8* 
              (3334.9)   (2292.9) 
  
Diconsa adj.*(Med 
marg)           1842.9   3570.5 
              (2942.8)   (2523.0) 
  Diconsa adj.*(Low marg)           7228.9   -11922.3 
              (6796.1)   (7293.2) 
            HH size   5104.3***   5068.8***   5069.3***   4468.8*** 
  
 
  (234.9)   (250.8)   (250.8)   (184.6) 
  HH income   0.0404***   0.0408***   0.0408***   0.0451*** 
  
 
  (0.00563)   (0.00661)   (0.00661)   (0.00694) 
  HH income sqr.   -1.22e-08***   -1.15e-08***   -1.15e-08***   -1.29e-08*** 
  
 
  (2.91e-09)   (2.41e-09)   (2.41e-09)   (2.64e-09) 
  Munip pop. Density   0.166**   0.313**   0.314**   0.319** 
  
 
  (0.0598)   (0.118)   (0.118)   (0.121) 
  Outside food exp.   -0.610***   -0.581***   -0.581***   -0.619*** 
  
 
  (0.0759)   (0.0903)   (0.0903)   (0.0876) 
  Outside food exp. Sqr.   0.00000902*   0.00000872   0.00000873   0.00000889* 
  
 
  (4E-06)   (4E-06)   (4E-06)   (4E-06) 
  Time dummy (1=2010)   740.4*   800.5*   760.6*   416.5 
  
 
  (336.5)   (370.1)   (369.9)   (332.7) 
  Constant term   -1484361.7*   -1605174.1*   -1525079.5*   -830878.0 
  
 
  (676287.4)   (743765.2)   (743447.6)   (668542.1) 
  Food purchase controls   X   X   x   x 
  Demographic controls   X   X   x   x 
  Locality size controls   X   X   x   x 
  CONAPO controls   X   X   x   x 
  Corn grain households   X   X   x     
  N   51040   45568   45568   43103 
  adj. R-sq   0.154   0.149   0.149   0.196 
                                                             
16
  ***significant at >0.1% **significant at >1% *significant at >5% (standard errors in parentheses) 
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Four models were run with standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The results 
are robust to various modifications of the regressor vector X as well as log-log and per capita 
specifications. A time dummy and a full set of CONAPO marginalisation index, demographic, 
food purchase frequency and locality size controls are included in each regression. Because there 
is an overall increase in caloric intake from 2008 to 2010, the total variation is absorbed in the 
large constant term. Overall, the results, in terms of an ATT estimate, appear to confirm those of 
the basic OLS and PSM approaches. The coefficient on the adjusted Diconsa treatment in the 
second model is significant at a ~0.1% level, while the coefficients on the (Diconsa adjusted x 
very highly marginalised dummy) and (Diconsa adjusted x highly marginalised) regressors are 
significant at the >5% and >0.1% level respectively. Given the definitions of treatment variables, 
the coefficient estimate for the adjusted Diconsa treatment is (very approximately) equivalent to 
the statement that a single Diconsa store in every rural locality across Mexico would increase 
average THN in the households in those locality/municipality subgroups by a mean 9278 calories 
per household per week, or ~290 calories per person per day, while the same calculation can 
theoretically be applied for rural localities in very highly or highly marginalised municipalities..  
The fact that only households in very highly and highly marginalised areas – the target 
areas of the Diconsa program – retain significance in model 3 adds further support to the notion 
that this variation in THN – in expenditure terms - is at least primarily due to the presence or 
absence of a Diconsa store. Model 4, with all households purchasing corn grain in the survey 
period excluded, lends further support to this hypothesis, as the same decrease in ATT estimate is 
observed, becoming insignificant in the case of the very highly marginalised households. We 
have already observed the increased purchase of corn grain amongst Diconsa households, so this 
serves as a useful source of identification. The results of these municipal-level regressions also 
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shed light on the possible reselling of corn grain by at least a minor subsample of the Diconsa 
treatment group. If this behaviour does indeed occur, it would appear that the reselling of grain 
occurs primarily within the same locality, or at least the same municipality. If the households 
were selling Diconsa purchased corn in different (better-off) municipalities or localities, one 
would expect the calorie increase to be distributed more evenly across the whole sample and thus 
the significance of the estimates would not be obtained in absence of sufficient correlation 
between the intensity of treatment variable and locality/municipality subgroups. If however, the 
Diconsa households are selling grain within the same geographic area, it appears to have, on 
average, a net positive effect on the caloric intake of all households in the area in question. If it is 
simply a case of the food markets in these areas being flooded with relatively cheap Diconsa 
grain, reflecting an overall increase in consumer demand, the Diconsa objective of increasing 
nutritional intake in the target areas has been achieved, albeit somewhat indirectly. The 
confinement of sales to the geographic area where the grain is purchased may be a result of the 
strategy of targeting remote rural locations, where the added opportunity cost of purchasing 
subsidised grain and then travelling to a better-off area to sell it might well be prohibitive. That 
said, the question of whether, assuming resale does occur, the households purchasing the extra 
grain are those most in need of the extra nutrition will remain an important one in need of further, 
more precise research.  
One final point must be addressed with regard possible confounding factors. This is the 
matter of cross-coverage between the Diconsa program and a variety of other social safety-net 
programs also operated in Mexico, e.g. the previously mentioned Opportunidades and the PAL 
in-kind transfers. A possible criticism directed at this study could be that the ATT observed here, 
rather than being the consumer response to the particular pattern of subsidies in Diconsa stores, is 
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actually the result of increased purchasing power of the Diconsa households who may be 
receiving greater a net income transfer than the control group once all other programs are taken 
into account. To address this objection, a conservative methodological approach suffices. This is 
as follows: 
1) Find the mean value of total weekly transfers (in-kind and cash transfers from all 
sources) for the Diconsa and Control group and the observed difference between the 
two 
2) Assume that all of the extra income is spent on Diconsa cereals, which were shown to 
have the maximum savings margin versus the market of ~17 calories per peso and 
thus estimate the maximum possible caloric increase resulting from the difference in 
transfers. 
The maximum possible increase in calories, from the estimate obtained through this approach, is 
833 calories per household per week, or roughly 6% of the total ATT. More detailed results can 
be found in Appendix V. Considering that this assumes all the extra income is spent on the most 
highly subsidised Diconsa products, it is likely a large overestimate of the possible proportion of 
the ATT accounted for by differences in other transfers. In the municipal-level case, regressing 
the peso value of transfers from different sources/programs (Opportunidades, etc) on the adjusted 
treatment variables reveals the correlation to be negative or insignificant for all sources except for 
Diconsa transfers, where a coefficient of 2.3 pesos is clearly not sufficient to overly distort the 
ATT estimate. Thus although it is conceivable that Diconsa households simply receive more 
transfers from other sources and use the extra income to purchase Diconsa products, even an 








.  This thesis has produced some original and informative results not only looking at overall 
nutritional effects, but also through a more in-depth investigation of how consumer behaviour in 
the targeted areas responds when offered the particular Diconsa pattern of food subsidies. The 
large increase in cereal consumption, driven primarily by bulk corn grain purchases, implies that 
the large savings margin prompts a significant consumer response. Specifically, the average 
Diconsa household food basket, as purchased, contains a greatly increased quantity of cereal 
products compared to the control households within the same total food expenditure bracket. In 
other food groups, the increases (and decreases) are minor or insignificant, which suggests that 
price effects of the subsidies are not overly detrimental in terms of the nutritional composition of 
the food basket as a whole. Overall, there appears to be strong evidence for some increase in 
caloric intake amongst the Diconsa households. This result stands in contrast to that of Cunha 
(2010), Kocha (2005) and Jensen and Miller (2008a), and suggests that this particular 
combination of geographic targeting and multiple, unrationed food subsidies appears to 
successfully overcome the problem of nutritionally-averse consumer response.  
It is necessary to concede, however, that the question of whether this increase in quantities 
purchased translates directly into increased nutritional intake for the household members in 
question remains unresolved. This is primarily due to the suspect surplus in household caloric 
intake for a significant subsample of the Diconsa group, which can be taken as at least suggestive 
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evidence that reselling of subsidised foods, in particular raw corn grain, occurs to some degree. 
This is one of the inherent difficulties in all analyses of household-level food consumption that 
rely on expenditure data rather than meticulously kept consumption diaries such as Jensen & 
Miller‟s randomised control trial in China (2008). On the other hand the results of the final OLS 
regression model with the augmented dataset allows some slightly more positive conclusions to 
be drawn in this regard. Firstly, the apparent increase in net nutrition intake that coincides with 
the establishment of a Diconsa outlet, particularly in areas of very high or high marginalisation, 
makes the argument that nutritional improvement is achieved in target areas a more persuasive 
one. The extent to which this holds true depends on exactly who constitutes the supplier and who 
constitutes the buyer in the grain resale market. Rogers (1988a) recognises that poorly targeted 
subsidy programs may suffer from the reselling of purchased commodities, but refers to the 
better-off selling to the worse-off. We observed, in the Diconsa sample, that the poorer 
households are more likely to purchase bulk quantities of grain greater than what would 
constitute the total nutritional requirements of the household, but that is not to say that the 
primary consumers of the resold commodities would be better-off households in general. 
Whether or not the Diconsa program is ideally targeted is not the primary motivation of this 
thesis, but the net welfare effects of black market sales of grain would depend on the 
homogeneity of the targeted areas. If there is a large market for cheap grain amongst the better-
off households in these areas, then the poorer Diconsa households would be effectively 
converting their social transfer in food terms into extra income. If, on the other hand, these 
households are selling to relatively worse-off households who do not have access to the Diconsa 
subsidies for whatever reason, there is a targeting problem that needs to be addressed, although 
the nutritional outcomes overall could still be positive for the worse-off, or indeed both, types of  
households. In the former case (worse-off selling to better-off), although the additional income 
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amounts to an increase in total utility for the selling households, the cost of establishing and 
maintaining the extensive Diconsa distribution network makes this an undesirable outcome, as 
the same transfer could be made in cash terms by various, generally simpler, mechanisms such a 
tax modifications or direct cash transfers. The point that the goals of overly complex social 
transfer systems that focus on in-kind transfers are often more efficiently achieved by direct cash 
transfers is well made by Cunha (2010) in his study of the PAL program in Mexico. Thus, if the 
majority of the extra nutrition contained in increased food purchases observed in this study is 
leaked to better-off households for whom food security is not an issue, a reform of the system – 
perhaps introducing weekly or monthly quotas - could be advisable. As the ENIGH dataset 
analysed in this thesis is not sufficient to answer this question conclusively, it is identified as a 
potentially important area for economic policy research.  
With recent food price spikes around the world, ensuring food security for the very 
poorest has become an increasingly important policy issue in many developing countries (Lustig, 
2009). Identifying exactly what overall welfare effects result for the poor is a very complex 
matter consisting of many different economic interactions on the macro and micro scale. What is 
certain, however, is that there will be significant social groups, in particular poor net buyers of 
staple foods, that will face serious problems in securing enough food to meet basic nutritional 
requirements. The typical health problems which result, particularly for children and those with 
pre-existing diseases like HIV, are well documented (WHO, 2003) and the social and economic 
consequences of widespread malnutrition should be underestimated. Therein lies the reason for 
the elevation of food by many to more than just a basic commodity to be bought and sold: it is 
considered a merit good, or even a fundamental right (Valdis, 1988). In the foreseeable future, 
governments around the world are thus destined to be concerned with designing, implementing 
74 
 
and evaluating various policies intended to ensure that those most in need are consistently able to 
secure enough food for basic subsistence without going undernourished. There are many possible 
forms that these safety nets can take – food for work, food for education, conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers, in-kind transfers, food stamp programs, school nutrition programs 
etc. – and the relative costs and benefits of each must be carefully considered in order that the 
problem is addressed in an effective manner as often as possible. This thesis has been an attempt 
to better illuminate the relative merits of a particular example of a certain type of food safety net 
– food subsidisation – so that those who make those difficult policy decisions hopefully might be 
slightly better informed. The Diconsa program is not unique in most respects, and assuming 
consumer behaviour with regard to food demand follows some basic laws, the results found here 
can be applied elsewhere. That is, the Diconsa strategy of subsidising multiple, unrationed staple 
foods  in rural, highly marginalised areas can potentially a) increase purchases of the subsidised 
staple food significantly, without overly detrimental substitution away from other food groups b) 
significantly increase caloric intake in the targeted area and c) result in leakages through the 
reselling of subsidised commodities.  Although this particular field of economic policy is in need 
of much further research, it is hoped that the analysis contained in this thesis represents at least a 
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Appendix III. Calorie requirements per day by sex & age  
(source: Instituto Nacional de Nutrición (INN), México 1983) 
        
  
 
Calories   
  Children     
  
 
    
  <3 years 1000   
  
 
    
  2-3 years 1000   
  
 
    
  4-6 years 1500   
  
 
    
  7-10 years 2000   
  
 
    
  Male     
  
 
    
  11-13 years 2500   
  
 
    
  14-18 years 3000   
  
 
    
  18-34 years 2750   
  
 
    
  35-54 years 2500   
  
 
    
  >55 years 2250   
  
 
    
  Female     
  
 
    
  11-18 years 2300   
  
 
    
  18-34 years 2000   
  
 
    
  35-54 years 1850   
  
 
    
  >55 years 1700   




Appendix IV. Probit regression for p-score. (source: author’s calculations) 
          
  
 
  Diconsa dummy   
          
  Large town dummy   0.144   
  
 
  (0.0804)   
  Small town dummy   0.788***   
  
 
  (0.0725)   
  Rural dummy   1.297***   
  
 
  (0.0686)   
  Detached toilet dummy   -0.0627   
  
 
  (0.0550)   
  Air conditioning dummy   -0.125   
  
 
  (0.0770)   
  Energy exp.   -0.0000768**   
  
 
  (0.0000260)   
  # Literate HH members   0.120   
  
 
  (0.110)   
  # HH members in school   -0.00471   
  
 
  (0.0478)   
  Public transport exp.   -0.0000249*   
  
 
  (0.0000123)   
  # Employed HH members   0.0382*   
  
 
  (0.0150)   
  2 floors dummy   -0.109   
  
 
  (0.0624)   
  3 floors dummy   -0.0732   
  
 
  (0.0786)   
  Water access type 1 dummy   0.00498   
  
 
  (0.0457)   
  Water access type 2 dummy   0.123*   
  
 
  (0.0554)   
  Water pump dummy   0.104*   
  
 
  (0.0523)   
  # Rooms   0.00114   
  
 
  (0.0131)   
  CONAPO 1 dummy   0.288***   
  
 
  (0.0743)   
82 
 
  CONAPO 2 dummy   0.398***   
  
 
  (0.0613)   
  CONAPO 3 dummy   0.169**   
  
 
  (0.0617)   
  CONAPO 4 dummy   -0.0161   
  
 
  (0.0648)   
  Family type 1 dummy   0.0730   
  
 
  (0.0962)   
  Family type 2 dummy   0.0436   
  
 
  (0.106)   
  Family type 3 dummy   -0.405   
  
 
  (0.315)   
  Family type 4 dummy   0.296   
  
 
  (0.371)   
  Microwave dummy   0.00396   
  
 
  (0.0464)   
  Toaster dummy   0.115   
  
 
  (0.0744)   
  HH income   -0.00000250   
  
 
  (0.00000135)   
  HH income sqr.   2.48e-12   
  
 
  (2.37e-12)   
  Monthly food purchases dummy   -0.00379   
  
 
  (0.0639)   
  Bi-monthly food purchases dummy   0.0594   
  
 
  (0.0488)   
  Weekly food purchases dummy   0.0724   
  
 
  (0.0420)   
  Bi-weekly food purchases dummy   0.0533   
  
 
  (0.0800)   
  Daily food purchases dummy   0.0660   
  
 
  (0.0402)   
  TV dummy   -0.183***   
  
 
  (0.0500)   
  Indigenous dummy   0.101*   
  
 
  (0.0433)   
  Demographics (caloric need)   0.0000144   
  
 
  (0.0000130)   





  (0.0314)   
  # Hours worked   -0.00327*   
  
 
  (0.00159)   
  # Hours repairing   0.0140   
  
 
  (0.00753)   
  # Hours housework   0.00204   
  
 
  (0.00258)   
  Extra work hours   -0.00000480   
  
 
  (0.0000299)   
  % of income from agriculture   0.392**   
  
 
  (0.150)   
  Outside food exp.   -0.000103   
  
 
  (0.0000821)   
  Mean HH age   0.0000427   
  
 
  (0.00251)   
  HH education level   -0.0408   
  
 
  (0.0211)   
  Age of HH head sqr.   0.00000848   
  
 
  (0.0000198)   
  Constant term    -2.274***   
  
 
  (0.220)   
          
  N   23739   
  Pseudo. R-sq   0.31   
 
***significant at >0.1% **significant at >1% *significant at >5% 










Appendix V. Calculation of max transfers component of ATT (source: author’s calculations) 
    #Obs Mean 
Std. 




    
  




    
  
  Total tranfers per week (CONTROL) 3354 313.0385 493.4052 0 10864.83   
                        
  Difference   49 





    
  
  Possible calorie increase (x17)   833 
   
  
                
 
